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The High Court continues to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to make declarations about 
interventions into the lives of situationally vulnerable adults with mental capacity. In light of 
protective responses of health care providers and the courts to decision-making situations 
involving capacitous vulnerable adults, this paper has two aims. The first is diagnostic. The 
second is normative. The first aim is to identify the harms to a capacitous vulnerable adult’s 
autonomy that arise on the basis of the characterisation of situational vulnerability and 
autonomy as fundamentally opposed concepts or the failure to adequately acknowledge the 
conceptual relationship between them at common law. The second part of this aim is to draw 
upon developments in analytic feminist philosophy to illustrate how standard approaches to 
autonomy are ill-equipped to capture the autonomy issues of capacitous vulnerable adults when 
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their decisions regarding care and treatment are at stake. The second (normative) aim is to 
develop an account of self-authorised, intersubjective autonomy on the basis of analytic 
feminist insights into relational practices of recognition. This approach not only attempts to 
capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults and account for the necessary harms to 
their autonomy that arise from standard common law responses to their situational 
vulnerability, it is also predicated on the distinctions between mental capacity, the satisfaction 
of conditions for informed consent and the exercise of autonomy, meaning that it is better 
placed to fulfil the primary aim of the inherent jurisdiction – to facilitate the autonomy of 
vulnerable adults with capacity. 
 








Recently, increased legal, ethical and philosophical attention on different conceptions of 
vulnerability has paralleled developments concerning the respect for, and protection of, patient 
autonomy. By responding and adapting to issues concerning problematic conceptualisations of 
the terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘autonomy’ in legal contexts, legal scholars and feminist 
philosophers have called into question the adequacy of common law approaches to autonomy. 
In addition, these criticisms have raised substantive problems with the application of standards 
of rationality and reason at law.  
The most important issue concerns the perception of autonomy and situational 
vulnerability (in the sense of situational risks to an individual’s autonomy of decision making) 
as oppositional concepts at common law. The courts have been compelled to exercise the 
inherent jurisdiction to make declarations about interventions into the lives of those deemed to 
be at risk of constraint, coercion, undue influence, and so on, even when they are deemed to 
have mental capacity. As Paul Skowron has observed by descriptively teasing out the way in 
which the concept of autonomy has been employed across a range of mental capacity cases, ‘if 
a person is found to have capacity, then they will be presumed to be autonomous, but that 
presumption may be rebutted if they are found to be vulnerable and subject to coercion’.1 It 
follows that capacitous vulnerable adults can be denied their decision-making authority not 
only so that – what the law presumes to be – more rational decisions may be effected, but also 
in order to protect them from malign external influences that would otherwise vitiate their 
consent to medical treatment.  
 
1 P Skowron, ‘The relationship between autonomy and adult mental capacity in the law of England and Wales’, 
(2019) Medical Law Review 27(1), 32–58, 54.  
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Although recent legal scholarship – in dialogue with feminist philosophy – has focused 
on the broader dimensions of vulnerability, including ontological and pathogenic forms of 
vulnerability,2 this paper is primarily concerned with diagnosing the problems with the two 
standard common law responses to the situational vulnerability of capacitous adults understood 
in terms of the risks to an individual’s autonomy of decision making – for the sake of clarity, 
and unless otherwise stated, when the term ‘capacitous vulnerable adults’ is employed in this 
paper, vulnerability should be interpreted in its situational sense.3  
There are two reasons for focusing on current legal responses to the situational 
vulnerability and autonomy of specifically capacitous adults. Firstly, from an autonomy 
perspective, I endorse the distinction between mental capacity and incapacity in principle. The 
conditions of mental capacity presented in s.3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act (‘MCA’) 2005, 
for example, are standardly taken by theorists of autonomy to be necessary (though 
insufficient) conditions for the capacity for autonomy.4 Thus, in principle, if an individual is 
correctly judged to lack capacity, then she will not be able to satisfactorily exercise her 
autonomy because she lacks the necessary cognitive capacities necessary to do so. Of course, 
as Beverley Clough and Jaime Lindsey argue, the lack of capacity should not be 
straightforwardly assumed on the basis of a person’s intrinsic or inherent vulnerability (i.e., 
their physical or intellectual disabilities).5 Secondly, Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall have 
observed that the MCA 2005 does not sufficiently distinguish between mental capacity and 
 
2 E.g., M Fineman, ‘The vulnerable subject: Anchoring equality in the human condition’, (2008) Yale Journal of 
Law and Feminism 20(1), 1–23; M Fineman, ‘The vulnerable subject and the responsive state’, (2010) Emory 
Law Journal 60(2), 251–275; KE Wilson, ‘The abolition or reform of mental health law: How should the law 
recognise and respond to the vulnerability of persons with mental impairment?’ (2020) Medical Law Review 
28(1), 30–64. 
3 For engagement with current legal responses to the situational vulnerability of incapacitous individuals in 
particular, see Clough B. ‘Vulnerability and capacity to consent to sex - Asking the right questions’, (2014) Child 
and Family Law Quarterly 26(4), 371-396; J Lindsey, ‘Developing vulnerability: A situational response to the 
abuse of women with mental disabilities’, (2016) Feminist Legal Studies 24, 295-314; B Clough. ‘Disability and 
vulnerability: Challenging the capacity/incapacity binary’, (2017) Social Policy and Society 16(3), 469-481. 
4 GO Schaefer, G Kahane & J Savulescu, ‘Autonomy and enhancement’, (2014) Neuroethics 7, 123-36; J Lewis, 
‘Autonomy and the Limits of Cognitive Enhancement’, (2020) Bioethics 35(1), 15-22.  
5 Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3; Lindsey op. cit. note 3; Clough (2017) op. cit. note 3. 
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autonomy.6 As a result, the MCA 2005 is unable to deal with cases where individuals, despite 
being judged to have capacity and despite their ability to genuinely exercise their autonomy, 
are judged to be situationally vulnerable. Therefore, in order to capture the autonomy of this 
specific group of vulnerable individuals, we need to move away from capacity tests and 
develop a normative framework that can sufficiently delineate mental capacity from the 
exercise of autonomy. Furthermore, as this paper will demonstrate in sections one and three, 
because the primary aim of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction is to facilitate ‘unencumbered 
decision making’ in order to support capacitous vulnerable individuals to deliver genuine 
consent, common law responses to their situational vulnerability preclude adequate 
engagement with the very question of their autonomy (or lack thereof). And the reason for this 
is because the fulfilment of the typical conditions for informed consent cannot be equated with 
the fulfilment of the conditions required for the exercise of autonomy. Consequently, in order 
to facilitate autonomy of decision making for vulnerable adults with capacity, the basis on 
which the inherent jurisdiction is currently employed requires reform along autonomy (rather 
than consent or capacity) lines (see §4). 
The paper begins by explaining the standard characterisation of vulnerability at 
common law (§1). It also situates the courts’ responses to the situational vulnerability of adults 
with mental capacity in relation to John Coggon’s and José Miola’s distinction between 
autonomy and liberty and their analysis of the competing standards that have been employed 
at common law to assess the rationality of decision-making processes. In light of recent 
developments in feminist philosophy, specifically, the branch of feminist theory known as 
analytic feminism, the following section (§2) explores the ways in which this literature has 
problematised the two standard common law responses to the situational vulnerability of 
 
6 J Herring & J Wall. ‘Autonomy, capacity and vulnerable adults: Filling the gaps in the Mental Capacity Act’, 
(2015) Legal Studies 35(4), 698-719.  
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capacitous patients. It not only demonstrates the ways in which the courts have either perceived 
the concepts of situational vulnerability and autonomy as conceptually oppositional or failed 
to adequately acknowledge the conceptual relationship between them, but also articulates the 
effects on an individual’s autonomy when the courts respond to a competent patient’s 
situational vulnerability on the basis of the perceived conceptual incompatibility between 
vulnerability and autonomy. In response, certain analytic feminists have argued that autonomy 
and situational vulnerability are, in fact, necessarily entwined concepts. However, as the 
following section (§3) illustrates, the claim that the concepts of autonomy and situational 
vulnerability are necessarily entwined cannot be based solely on mental capacity 
considerations, standards of informed consent or processes of ‘unencumbered decision 
making’ as traditionally employed in discussions of vulnerable adults and, more generally, 
patient autonomy. Furthermore, it will be shown that certain approaches to the concept of 
‘relational autonomy’ in analytic feminism also fail to capture the necessary harms to the 
autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults that result from common law approaches to the 
conceptual relationship between autonomy and situational vulnerability.  
Having diagnosed the problems with common law responses to the situational 
vulnerability of capacitous adults, the final section (§4) develops a reasonable normative 
framework by which to capture and promote the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults. It 
extends recent analytic feminist scholarship to argue for a particular approach to relational 
autonomy, one that not only better supports the primary aim of the inherent jurisdiction (i.e., 
to facilitate autonomy of decision making), but also bridges the gap between a patient’s 
autonomy and their liberty at law (a gap that, according to legal scholars, has proven to be 
particularly difficult to navigate).7 This particular approach to autonomy is used to argue for 
 
7 J Coggon & J Miola, ‘Autonomy, liberty, and medical decision-making’, (2011) Cambridge Law Journal 70(3), 
523–47.  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the duty to promote the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults where possible, whilst 
remaining considerate of, and potentially responsive to, more established duties of protection. 
Consequently, this section presents some general normative considerations by which health 
care practitioners and the courts can navigate the tension between their duty to promote the 
autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults and the duty to protect them from harms to their 
health and well-being in general.    
 
I. LIBERTY, AUTONOMY AND THE SITUATIONALLY VULNERABLE ADULT 
 
Informed consent is the standard mechanism through which a patient exercises their liberty at 
law to reach a decision on the basis of their sovereignty – the domain that protects individuals 
from non-consensual bodily interference.8 Violations of a patient’s sovereignty are wrong 
because they are considered to be trespasses upon the body without explicit, voluntary consent 
as opposed to specific interferences with the reasoning processes that govern a patient’s 
behaviour. Consequently, if there is a domain over which the patient is sovereign, then, on the 
basis of settled legal principle, lawful reason is required before it is permissible to breach her 
bodily integrity.9 However, juvenility, mental impairment and factual ignorance all may bar a 
person from having liberty at law.10  
 Employing informed consent as the instrument through which an individual exerts their 
rightful authority to make a medical decision is problematic because it has led to: (i) the courts 
confusing the language of autonomy with the concept of liberty; and (ii) the running together 
of the conditions for autonomy and the conditions for mental capacity in the MCA 2005. In 
 
8 J Lewis, ‘Getting obligations right: Autonomy and shared decision making’, (2020) Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 37(1), 118-40.  
9 J Coggon, ‘Mental capacity law, autonomy, and best interests: An argument for conceptual and practical clarity 
in the court of protection’, (2016) Medical Law Review 24(3), 396–414, 405. 
10 Lewis op. cit. note 8, 121.  
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terms of the autonomy-liberty distinction, the courts have assumed that if a physician imparts 
to a patient a list of medically relevant information associated with a treatment and allows the 
latter to choose based on that information, then the patient’s decision is rendered autonomous.11 
However, such an approach provides no assurances that the patient has, in fact, understood or 
rationally deliberated on the information with which she has been provided.12 Furthermore, 
with regards to mental capacity and autonomy, although the former is often taken to be 
necessary condition for the capacity for autonomy to the extent that the latter involves one’s 
capacities to understand, retain, use and weigh information relevant to a decision and 
communicate a decision, the MCA 2005 does not sufficiently distinguish between the 
conditions for mental capacity and the conditions for autonomous choice and action.13 
Consequently, neither satisfactory fulfilment of the capacity to understand and deliberate nor 
the provision of medically relevant information in a way that does not undermine the 
voluntariness of the decision are, in themselves or taken together, sufficient to ensure that the 
resulting decision is autonomous. 
 In order to avoid confusing autonomy with liberty as well as the running together of the 
conditions for mental capacity and the exercise of autonomy, there have been developments at 
common law that oblige a physician to ensure that a patient has adequately understood the 
information with which they have been provided and has reflected on that information in light 
of her own values, desires and motivations in accordance with certain standards of rationality.14 
Thus, when the statutory test for capacity is interpreted in the light of established medical 
jurisprudence, ‘there is a concern not just for the capacity for reason, but also for the effective 
 
11 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7, 535-36.  
12 Similar criticisms of the model of informed consent have been developed within medical ethics. E.g., S Dodds, 
‘Choice and control in feminist bioethics’ in C Mackenzie & N Stoljar (eds), Relational autonomy: Feminist 
perspectives on autonomy, agency and the social self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 213–35; O 
O’Neill, Autonomy and trust in bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); R Kukla, 
‘Conscientious autonomy: Displacing decisions in healthcare’, (2005) Hastings Center Report 35(2), 34–44.  
13 Herring and Wall op. cit. note 6; Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3; Clough (2017) op. cit. note 3. 
14 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7, 537-43. Herring and Wall op. cit. note 6, 704. 
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use of it’.15 In short, we are required to ‘judge the quality of a person’s exercise of autonomy 
by the soundness of her reasoning, given her own values’.16 Where autonomy (as opposed to 
liberty or mental capacity) is concerned, English and Welsh medical law demands non-
prejudicial deference to the rationality of a patient’s decision and, simultaneously, the values 
on which her decision is based. Thus, we see in the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB [2015] that ‘a patient is entitled to take into account her own 
values, her own assessment of the comparative merits of giving birth in the “natural” and 
traditional way and of giving birth by caesarean section, whatever medical opinion may say, 
alongside the medical evaluation of the risks to herself and her baby’.17 Observing that a patient 
may value one procedure over another, Lady Hale states that ‘the medical profession must 
respect her choice, unless she lacks the legal capacity to decide’.18 
 One of the reasons for disambiguating between patient autonomy, liberty at law and 
mental capacity is that the former is concerned with the requirement to permit competent, 
legally non-vulnerable individuals to effect changes in their lives in a manner that is consistent 
with the values, desires and motivations that they themselves would voluntarily endorse. At 
the same time, the ‘effective use of reason’ approach to autonomy is needed in order to identify 
and respond to concerns regarding the welfare of vulnerable adults. As legal scholars have 
observed, if the law was to ignore a patient’s exercise of their capacity for reason in favour of 
a purely statutory approach to capacity that supports a patient’s liberty to partake in informed 
 
15 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7, 528. This coincides with more recent developments in medical ethics where 
it has been argued that a patient’s autonomy pertains to exercises of her capacity for reason. See J Holroyd, 
‘Relational autonomy and paternalistic interventions’, (2009) Res Publica 15, 325-26; Schaefer, Kahane and 
Savulescu op. cit. note 4; Lewis, op. cit. note 4. 
16 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7, 531.  
17 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] 1 AC 1430 at [115] per Lady Hale.  
18 ibid. 
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consent,19 then this formalised ‘stand-offishness’ would fail to address questions concerning 
the welfare of those deemed to be situationally vulnerable.20  
 According to Robert E. Goodin, to be vulnerable is to be susceptible to threats to one’s 
interests from particular agents.21 Although everyone is potentially vulnerable to such threats, 
what makes some persons or groups ‘vulnerable’ from the point of view of the law is their 
dependency on others for care and/or their diminished power to protect themselves from harm 
or exploitation by others.22 Since the introduction of the MCA 2005, there has been debate 
regarding the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to make declarations about interventions into 
the lives of capacitous adults who are situationally vulnerable.23 Exercises of the inherent 
jurisdiction are based upon ‘external’ and ‘objective’ assessments of risks to an individual’s 
power to exercise her autonomy.24 25 Although risks can sometimes be identified on the basis 
of an individual’s characteristics, such as mental impairment or other disability, being deaf, 
blind or dumb or handicapped by illness, injury or deformity,26 legal determinations regarding 
an individual’s situational vulnerability are specifically concerned with identifying the risks of 
an individual being constrained, coerced, influenced unduly, otherwise ‘incapacitated’ or 
‘disabled from giving or expressing a real and genuine consent’ (despite being judged to have 
 
19 E.g., Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] EWCA Civ 18, [1993] Fam 95 at [116]–[117] per Lord 
Donaldson M.R.. 
20 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7, 527-28; Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3; Herring and Wall op. cit. note 6; E 
Cave, ‘Protecting patients from their bad decisions: Rebalancing rights, relationships, and risk.’ (2017) Medical 
Law Review 25(4), 527–553, 546; Clough (2017) op. cit. note 3; Skowron op. cit. note 1.  
21 RE Goodin, Protecting the vulnerable: A reanalysis of our social responsibilities (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), 112.  
22 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Who decides? Making decisions on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults 
(London: Stationery Office, 1997). Also see Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage) [2005] EWHC 
2942 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 867 at [82] per Munby J. 
23 M Dunn, I Clare & A Holland, ‘To empower or to protect? Constructing the “vulnerable adult” in English law 
and public policy’ (2008) Legal Studies 28(2), 234-53; Cave op. cit. note 20. The question of whether the inherent 
jurisdiction has survived so as to protect vulnerable adults who are deemed to have mental capacity has, 
seemingly, been answered by the decision of the Court of Appeal in DL v A Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 
253, [2012] CPLR 504. Also see London Borough of Wandsworth v M & Ors [2017] EWHC 2435 (Fam), [2018] 
1 FLR 919; Southend-on-Sea Borough Council v Meyers [2019] EWHC 399 (Fam).  
24 Dunn, Clare and Holland op. cit. note 23, 241. 
25 For a broader exploration of vulnerability, beyond capacitous vulnerable adults and the characterisation of 
situational vulnerability at common law, see Wilson op. cit. note 2. 
26 Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage) [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 867 at [79] and 
[82] per Munby J. 
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the mental capacity to make the decision in question).27 Furthermore, the High Court 
recognises that the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction is not necessarily linked to a specific 
decision that a vulnerable adult is required to make. Indeed, the aim is (often) to prevent 
circumstances within which an adult might not have the power to make a voluntary decision at 
an ascertainable point in the future.28 Such an approach parallels the public policy 
‘safeguarding’ of vulnerable adults from abuse in care services and the statutory protection of 
vulnerable witnesses in the criminal justice system.29  
 There are two standard common law responses to the situational vulnerability of 
capacitous individuals. Firstly, the High Court has suggested that it will seek to exercise the 
inherent jurisdiction so as to facilitate the process of ‘unencumbered decision making’,30 the 
purpose of which is to ‘allow the individual to be able to regain their autonomy of decision 
making’.31 Such a process attempts to alleviate vulnerability by supporting capacitous 
vulnerable adults to make decisions free of external pressure or physical restraint,32 which 
would otherwise impact upon their ‘free will and ability and capacity to reach decisions’.33 In 
terms of alleviating vulnerability, ‘the purpose, in respect of a capacitated but vulnerable adult, 
is to create a situation where he or she can receive outside help free of coercion, to enable him 
or her to weigh things up and decide freely what he or she wishes to do’.34  
 
27 According to Munby J., such circumstances include ‘the effects of deception, misinformation, physical 
disability, illness, weakness (physical, mental or moral), tiredness, shock, fatigue, depression, pain or drugs’. See 
Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage) [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 867 at [78] per 
Munby J. 
28 Dunn, Clare and Holland op. cit. note 23, 236. 
29 Although medical ethicists recognise that vulnerability is an ontological condition of all human existence, they 
have also employed the concept to identify those who are especially vulnerable to threats to their ‘dignity’, ‘rights’ 
and ‘capacity to live as free, autonomous individual[s]’ as a result of situational features. E.g., UNESCO, The 
principle of respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity: Report of the International Bioethics 
Committee of UNESCO (IBC) (Paris: UNESCO, 2013), 9-16. Retrieved from 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000219494. 
30 LBL v RYJ and VJ [2010] EWHC 2665 (COP) at [62] per Macur J.; DL v A Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 
253, [2012] CPLR 504 at [67] per McFarlane L.J. 
31 DL v A Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253, [2012] CPLR 504 at [67] per McFarlane L.J.; London Borough 
of Croydon v KR & Anor [2019] EWHC 2498 (Fam) at [40] per Lieven J. 
32 Cave op. cit. note 20, 533. 
33 LBL v RYJ and VJ [2010] EWHC 2665 (COP) at [62]-[63] per Macur J. 
34 A Local Authority v Mrs A and Mr A [2010] EWHC 1549 (Fam) (COP) at [79] per Bodey J. 
 12 
 However, although the courts have stated that ‘unencumbered decision making’ is 
meant to help situationally vulnerable adults with capacity to ‘regain their autonomy of 
decision making’ in the face of risks to their autonomy, the actual aim – when we take into 
account the distinctions between autonomy, liberty and mental capacity as outlined above – is 
to support a capacitous vulnerable adult to fulfil the typical conditions required for informed 
consent, thereby, in effect, securing her liberty at law.35 Notably, then, the first standard 
response to situational vulnerability at common law fails, at least in principle, to fulfil its stated 
aim, that is, to ‘allow the individual to be able to regain their autonomy of decision making’. 
And the reason for this comes down to lack of appreciation for the specific conceptual 
relationship between the concepts of situational vulnerability and autonomy (see §3).  
 The second standard common law response to situational vulnerability implies that the 
High Court is, at least in principle, concerned with restoring a certain amount of autonomy to 
a decision-making situation. However, whereas the first standard response attempts to alleviate 
the vulnerability of the adult through the process of ‘unencumbered decision making’, the 
second aims to remove vulnerability from the decision-making situation altogether. This is 
achieved by granting decision-making authority to a designated non-vulnerable third party to 
make decisions in the best interests of the vulnerable individual in question. As will be 
demonstrated below (§2), such a response is predicated on the perceived conceptual 
incompatibility between the concept of situational vulnerability and the concept of autonomy. 
 Where questions of autonomy, as opposed to liberty, are specifically concerned, legal 
scholars have shown that, through the exercise of court powers, the law has developed on the 
back of two contradictory bases: (i) ‘rational decision-making given an individual’s own 
values’; and (ii) ‘rational decision-making given some objective or in principle universally 
 
35 J Lewis, ‘Capturing and promoting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults’, (2020) Journal of Medical 
Ethics (online ahead of print). doi: 10.1136/medethics-2020-106835. 
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acceptable values’.36 The former is meant to provide a level of autonomy protection at law for 
those that are legally non-vulnerable. The latter standard is applied to legally vulnerable adults 
in order to ensure that ‘more rational’ decisions are effected for the protection of their health 
or well-being in general.  
 Where interventions into the lives of situationally vulnerable adults with capacity are 
concerned, there are two problems tied to the development of two incompatible standards for 
rational decision making, both of which are based on the two standard common law responses 
to capacitous adults who are judged to be situationally vulnerable. Where determinations of a 
vulnerable adult’s ability to make medical decisions for themselves are at stake, the first 
problem is that the High Court is primarily concerned with the effects of constraint, coercion 
or undue influence on her ability to fulfil the typical conditions required for giving genuine 
consent. As Bodey J. observed, determinations regarding a capacitous vulnerable adult’s ability 
to give or express genuine consent should focus solely on the effects of malign external 
influences on the patient’s capacity to manage information relating to ‘proximate medical 
issues’.37 The point is that such determinations should not be based on the effects of constraint, 
coercion, undue influence, and so on, on the soundness of the capacitous vulnerable adult’s 
reasoning in light of her own values, desires and motives. Second, and relatedly, the High 
Court’s focus on the effects of an individual’s situational vulnerability on their ability to 
exercise their liberty at law precludes adequate engagement with the very question of their 
autonomy. Specifically, because fulfilling the conditions for genuine consent cannot be equated 
with exercising personal autonomy,38 such an approach ignores the possibility that situationally 
vulnerable adults with capacity can reason soundly in accordance with their own values, desires 
 
36 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7, 543.  
37 A Local Authority v Mrs A and Mr A [2010] EWHC 1549 (Fam) (COP) at [64] per Bodey J. For further 
discussion, see K Keywood. ‘Safeguarding reproductive health? The inherent jurisdiction, contraception and 
mental capacity’, (2011) Medical Law Review 19, 326-333. 
38 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7; Cave op. cit. note 20; Lewis op. cit. note 35. 
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and motives and come to a decision that coheres with those motivating reasons, thereby 
fulfilling the conditions of rational deliberation that philosophers and moral psychologists take 
to be a necessary feature of autonomy. In response to this problem, section four offers an 
alternative normative approach, the employment of which, in principle, satisfies the High 
Court’s aim to facilitate the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults. 
 
II. ANALYTIC FEMINISM AND ITS RESPONSES TO VULNERABILITY AND 
AUTONOMY 
 
Like other feminist philosophers, analytic feminists argue that traditional concepts, such as 
autonomy, rationality, truth and objectivity, have been ‘perverted’ by androcentrism and 
sexism throughout the history of philosophy.39 However, unlike other feminist approaches, 
there is a ‘core desire’ to retain, and form clear conceptions of, these concepts.40 By 
reproducing philosophical concepts through the application of feminist insights, analytic 
feminists aim to not only cast new light on issues in philosophy,41 but also generate ‘inclusive’ 
philosophical theories that ‘work’ for all sorts of women and men, that counter sexism and 
androcentrism and that empower and liberate women.42  
 For the purposes of this paper, one of the discipline’s most important developments has 
been to challenge the ‘individualistic’ and ‘abstract’ paradigm of the autonomous agent by, 
firstly, emphasising the concrete facets of situations in which autonomy capacities are 
 
39 E.g., AE Cudd, ‘Analytic feminism’ in DM Borchert (ed), The encyclopedia of philosophy supplement (New 
York: Macmillan, 1996), 20–21; M Fricker & J Hornsby (eds), The Cambridge companion to feminism in 
philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); S Crasnow & A Superson (eds), Out from the 
shadows: Analytical feminist contributions to traditional philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); P 
Garavaso (ed), The Bloomsbury companion to analytic feminism (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2018); A 
Garry, ‘Analytic feminism’ in EN Zalta (ed), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2018).  Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/femapproach-analytic/. 
40 Garry op. cit. note 39. 
41 AE Cudd, ‘Analytic feminism’ in E Craig (ed), Encyclopedia of philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 157–
59. 
42 Garry op. cit. note 39. 
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exercised.43 Secondly, rather than focus on the dichotomy between the ‘rational individual’ and 
the ‘social’, analytic feminists have developed arguments that place greater attention on the 
roles of interpersonal relations, social interaction and communities in autonomy-determining 
contexts. This shift of focus from the ‘abstract’ and the ‘individual’ to the ‘concrete’ and the 
‘relational’ has informed feminist criticisms of the law’s approach to situational vulnerability.  
 Even though the ‘effective use of reason’ approach to autonomy is applied at law to 
protect the welfare of vulnerable individuals, there is a danger, according to analytic feminists, 
of removing ‘general protections’, such as liberty at law and respect for autonomy, ‘with less 
clearly agreed or articulated protections’.44 It has been argued that this tension between general 
protections for ‘shared vulnerabilities’ and special considerations for the situationally 
vulnerable can have a number of effects. Firstly, the courts’ focus on the effects of coercion, 
constraint and undue influence on a vulnerable adult’s ability to give genuine consent, and the 
primary concern with facilitating ‘unencumbered decision making’, is premised upon the 
liberal ideal of a free, independent decision or choice, which seems to treat vulnerability as a 
contingent matter with lawmakers ‘seeking to restore or impose individual responsibility for 
independence on those who are dependent and vulnerable’.45 This kind of facilitative approach 
too readily discounts the ways in which a vulnerable adult’s ability to exercise their autonomy 
in decision-making situations is dependent on legal and health care recognition.46 Secondly, 
for those vulnerable adults who are, on the basis of legal definition,47 taken to be at risk to 
threats to their ‘autonomy of decision making’, the denial of decision-making authority and its 
 
43 P Garavaso, ‘Introduction to feminist epistemology’ in P Garavaso (ed), The Bloomsbury companion to analytic 
feminism (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2018), 171-87; A Roth & P Garavaso, ‘Introduction to feminist 
value theory’ in P Garavaso (ed), The Bloomsbury companion to analytic feminism (London and New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2018), 355-74.  
44 W Rogers, ‘Vulnerability and bioethics’ in C Mackenzie, W Rogers & S Dodds (eds), Vulnerability: New essays 
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[82] per Munby J. 
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replacement with substituted decision making or best-interests decisions can compound rather 
than alleviate such threats.48 Thirdly, those that are denied their liberty to partake in decision-
making processes that guard against coercion and misinformation may find that they are even 
more susceptible to malign external influences.49 Fourthly, analytic feminists have cautioned 
about the dangers attendant upon labelling particular individuals or groups as vulnerable, 
arguing that this can lead to discrimination, stereotyping and objectionably paternalistic social 
relations and policies.50 Fifthly, the tendency to focus on a narrow set of duties of protection 
for the situationally vulnerable largely ignores obligations to promote autonomy wherever 
possible.51 
 These five criticisms respond to a particular conception of the relationship between 
autonomy and vulnerability in law and public policy. As Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds 
observe, autonomy and vulnerability can be perceived as oppositional concepts in these two 
areas. Specifically, they interpret the opposition as a contrast between ‘the liberal (autonomous) 
subject’ and ‘the vulnerable subject’.52 As we have seen, the High Court’s exercise of its 
inherent jurisdiction is predicated on the distinction between the liberal subject, who is legally 
recognised as able to give genuine consent without additional support, and the situationally 
vulnerable subject, who is recognised as unable to give genuine consent (without the additional 
support of ‘unencumbered decision making’) and thereby denied the opportunity to exercise 
their liberty at law. For analytic feminists, the opposition between ‘the liberal (autonomous) 
 
48 C Mackenzie, ‘The importance of relational autonomy and capabilities for an ethics of vulnerability’ in C 
Mackenzie, W Rogers & S Dodds (eds) Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014): 33-59, 39.  
49 Rogers op. cit. note 44, 73.  
50 S Dodds, ‘Inclusion and exclusion in women’s access to health and medicine’, (2008) International Journal of 
Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 1(2), 58-79; F Luna, ‘Elucidating the concept of vulnerability: Layers not 
labels’, (2009) International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 2(1), 121–39; W Rogers, C Mackenzie 
& S Dodds, ‘Why bioethics needs a concept of vulnerability’, (2012) International Journal of Feminist 
Approaches to Bioethics 5(2), 11–38; Dodds op. cit. note 45. 
51 Mackenzie op. cit. note 48; Dodds op. cit. note 45. 
52 C Mackenzie, W Rogers & S Dodds, ‘What is vulnerability and why does it matter for moral theory?’ in C 
Mackenzie, W Rogers & S Dodds (eds), Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (Oxford: 
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subject’ and ‘the vulnerable subject’ is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, when it comes to 
the first standard common law response to situational vulnerability, that is, the facilitation of 
the process of ‘unencumbered decision making’, ensuring that a situationally vulnerable 
individual fulfils the typical conditions required for genuine consent precludes adequate 
engagement with the very question of that individual’s autonomy. Secondly, when the courts 
respond to the situational vulnerability of a competent adult by focussing on a narrow set of 
duties to protect her welfare, the door can be opened to objectionably paternalistic forms of 
intervention that violate her autonomy.53 In order to understand how these two types of 
common law response to situational vulnerability violate or preclude adequate engagement 
with the autonomy of situationally vulnerable adults, it is worth exploring two of the very 
limited number of cases to deal with questions of health care decision making (as opposed to 
questions of contact, residence, sexual consent, and so on).   
 Focusing our discussions on the second standard common law response, the court in 
Mazhar v Lord Chancellor [2017] heard how an NHS Trust had made a without notice, out-
of-hours application to the High Court seeking to remove Mr Mazhar, a 26-year-old with 
muscular dystrophy, from his home and to treat him in hospital.54 The claimant had a 
tracheostomy and was equipped with a ventilator, with care provided in his home by NHS care 
staff. He lived with his mother and sisters, who had also been trained to provide specialist care. 
In all material respects, and, in particular, with regard to decisions about his care, Mr Mazhar 
was deemed to have mental capacity. However, the Trust made an application to the High Court 
on the basis that: (i) care staff were not available to tend to Mr Mazhar at his home for one 
weekend; (ii) his mother was not trained to provide specialist care for him; and (iii) according 
 
53 For a detailed discussion of how the inherent jurisdiction is set up to yield ‘draconian decisions’ that harm 
vulnerable adults, see A Pugh, ‘Emergencies and equivocality under the inherent jurisdiction: A Local Authority 
v BF [2018] EWCA CIV 2962 and Southend-On-Sea Borough Council v Meyers [2019] EWHC 399 (FAM)’, 
(2019) Medical Law Review 27(4), 675-86. Also see Cave op. cit. note 20, 541-6.  
54 Mazhar v Lord Chancellor [2017] EWHC 2536 (Fam), [2018] Fam 257. 
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to a witness statement made by an employee of the Trust, he was oppressively influenced by 
the forcefully expressed views of a number of his relatives. Based on the evidence available, 
the judge decided that this was sufficient to make an order under the inherent jurisdiction for 
Mr Mazhar to be taken to hospital and deprived of his liberty while there. The order was made 
without Mr Mazhar being notified and without any opportunity to communicate with the court. 
Furthermore, the order went against Mr Mazhar’s explicit wish not to be taken to hospital.  
 The case was heard on appeal in October 2020,55 during which Baker L.J. stated that 
although it was unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment ‘to consider the extent of the 
inherent jurisdiction in respect of vulnerable adults and, in particular, whether it extends to the 
making of an order that has the effect of depriving a vulnerable adult of liberty, provided the 
provisions of article 5 are met’,56 the initial judgment was wrong. Firstly, the Trust’s 
application contained a statement that did not ‘explain whether and, if so, why it was necessary 
to proceed without proper notice to Mr Mazhar or affording him the opportunity to make 
representations’ – such an explanation was also absent from both the draft and the sealed 
orders.57 Secondly, although Baker L.J. acknowledged that the High Court has jurisdiction to 
make an interim order in an emergency situation if the court has ‘reason to believe’ that a 
vulnerable individual is being unduly influenced, the point is that there was nothing in the 
sealed order to indicate whether the judge had applied this test to Mr Mazhar’s case or on what 
basis it had been satisfied.58 Thirdly, even if the judge had applied this test, Baker L.J. observed 
that there ‘was manifestly insufficient evidence to satisfy it’.59 
 In one sense, it is obvious how the denial of decision-making authority can violate the 
autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults. The point is that the speech acts that Mr Mazhar 
 
55 Mazhar v Birmingham Community Healthcare Foundation NHS Trust & Ors (Rev 1) [2020] EWCA Civ 1377, 
[2020] WLR(D) 579. 
56 ibid., at [52] per Baker L.J. 
57 ibid., at [64] per Baker L.J. 
58 ibid., at [68] per Baker L.J. 
59 ibid., at [69] per Baker L.J. 
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was denied from performing – refusals – are precisely those speech acts that are otherwise used 
to deny permissions and exert the boundaries of one’s sovereign authority over one’s body. By 
denying Mr Mazhar the ability to successfully make refusals regarding the intervention that the 
NHS Trust deemed to be in his best interest, the court’s exercise of its inherent jurisdiction led 
to the violation of his autonomy qua his sovereignty. 
 However, as Baker L.J acknowledged, one might argue that this specific violation of 
Mr Mazhar’s autonomy resulted from a ‘gross and obvious irregularity’ in the application of 
legal reasoning rather than from the exercise of a jurisdiction that the courts perceive to be 
‘substantially protective in nature’.60 After all, the judge was not party to the agreed facts and 
made the order on the basis of the presented evidence. Baker L.J. considered the possibility 
that NHS Trust may have believed that the order was an appropriate intervention to the extent 
that it was made in Mr Mazhar’s best interests given that: ‘(1) Mr Mazhar was in urgent need 
of specialist medical care; (2) the Trust could not provide that care at home overnight; and (3) 
on the Trust's case (contested by Mr Mazhar), the family members were not qualified to provide 
it’.61 The problem with this interpretation of the appropriateness of the order is that it ignores 
the fact that Mr Mazhar is a vulnerable adult with mental capacity. In light of the MCA 2005, 
such an order would be unlawful if it was made regarding a legally non-vulnerable adult with 
capacity. Due to the fact that the judge was aware that Mr Mazhar had capacity in all material 
respects, it was the latter’s legal status as a vulnerable person that, ultimately, determined the 
court’s response to the NHS Trust’s application. Specifically, the legal identification of Mr 
Mazhar as ‘vulnerable’ would have led the judge to question whether Mr Mazhar’s refusal to 
undertake medical treatment in hospital could be given voluntarily and thereby whether the 
undue influence vitiated the refusal. Therefore, because the judge’s response to the case was, 
 
60 ibid., at [71] and [56] per Baker L.J. 
61 ibid., at [67] per Baker L.J. 
 20 
in effect, grounded in legal precedent, which, as Baker L.J. acknowledged, has established 
situational vulnerability in terms of the risks of being constrained, coerced or otherwise 
prevented from giving genuine consent, the violation of Mr Mazhar’s autonomy stemmed from 
the ‘protection imperative’, which tends to ‘arise whenever a court is exercising a jurisdiction 
that is substantially protective in nature’,62 rather than from a problematic application of legal 
reasoning in this specific instance. Furthermore, this kind of response to situational 
vulnerability led to the violation of Mr Mazhar’s autonomy because it supports best-interest 
interventions that not only violate a capacitous vulnerable adult’s sovereign authority over their 
body, but also preclude capacitous vulnerable adults like Mr Mazhar from making claims to 
autonomy altogether.63  
 Although they are not focused on questions of medical treatment or care, the series of 
TZ cases highlight similar problems with the High Court’s protectionist response.64 Even 
though TZ was declared to have capacity to consent to sexual relations, there was a concern 
that, in exercising this capacity in particular instances, he might, in fact, lack capacity as a 
result of his vulnerability to malign external influences. To resolve this issue, a distinction was 
made between the capacity to consent to sex and the capacity to consent to contact. As Clough 
observes, by drawing such a distinction, ‘the court is entitled to then make best interests 
decisions on behalf of TZ in relation to particular relationships, as it becomes not a question of 
sexual capacity, but a point of emphasis on contact’.65 However, despite the ability of the court 
to purportedly make declarations to support TZ to have contact and sexual relations with 
another individual, the type of support being offered is, ultimately, dependent on what the court 
 
62 ibid., at [56] per Baker L.J. 
63 J. Anderson, ‘Autonomy and vulnerability entwined.’ in C Mackenzie, W Rogers & S Dodds 
(eds), Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 134-
61, 144-5. This point was acknowledged by Baker L.J. in the case of Mr Mazhar heard on appeal (Mazhar v 
Birmingham Community Healthcare Foundation NHS Trust & Ors (Rev 1) [2020] EWCA Civ 1377, [2020] 
WLR(D) 579 at [57] per Baker L.J). 
64 A Local Authority v TZ (By his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) [2013] EWHC 2322 (COP); A Local 
Authority v TZ (By His Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) (No 2) [2014] EWHC 973 (COP). 
65 Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3, 388. 
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deems to be in his best interests in relation to contact. Thus, according to Clough, 'support' is 
something that can be, in principle, imposed ‘against TZ's own will and preferences in his best 
interests’ without adequate consideration of the exercise of his autonomy.66 
 To the extent that interventions based on the perceived conceptual opposition between 
situational vulnerability and autonomy preclude situationally vulnerable adults with capacity 
from making claims to autonomy, analytic feminists have suggested that such responses give 
rise to another form vulnerability - pathogenic vulnerability.67 What distinguishes pathogenic 
vulnerability from the concept of vulnerability invoked by the English and Welsh courts is the 
fact that the former represents the exacerbation of an individual’s already compromised power 
to exercise her autonomy as engendered by her  legal characterisation as someone who is unable 
to give genuine consent (due to being at risk of coercion, constraint, undue influence, and so 
on). For analytic feminists, the problem with contrasting autonomy and situational 
vulnerability, and thereby responding to the latter by imposing a protective framework that 
denies a situationally vulnerable adult her decision-making authority, is that, as we have seen 
with the cases of Mr Mazhar and TZ, it can have the paradoxical effect of rendering an already 
vulnerable individual even more powerless to exercise her autonomy.68  
 Turning now to the first standard common law response to situational vulnerability, the 
case of A Local Authority v Mrs A and Mr A [2010] differs from case involving Mr Mazhar in 
the sense that Mrs A was deemed to lack capacity to consent to contraceptive treatment, even 
though the absence of capacity resulted primarily from the unequal dynamic in the relationship 
between Mr and Mrs A such that ‘her decision not to continue taking contraception [was] not 
the product of her own free will’.69 The point is that, from an autonomy perspective, Mrs A 
 
66 ibid. 
67 The development of the concept of pathogenic vulnerability is built upon Goodin op. cit. note 21, 194-201. For 
a discussion of pathogenic vulnerability of persons with mental impairment, see Wilson op. cit. note 2. 
68 Mackenzie op. cit. note 48, 39. Dodds op. cit. note 45, 197-201. 
69 A Local Authority v Mrs A and Mr A [2010] EWHC 1549 (Fam) (COP) at [73] per Bodey J. 
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was deemed to lack mental capacity, the conditions of which are commonly taken to be 
necessary conditions for the capacity for autonomy. Thus, in principle, although it is possible 
to capture the autonomy of a capacitous vulnerable individual by drawing upon the 
cognitively-based procedural conditions commonly taken to be the central features of 
autonomous choice and action, it is not possible, at least in this specific context, to capture the 
autonomy of Mrs A using the same theoretical tools (assuming that Mrs A was correctly judged 
to lack capacity). Instead, as the judge implicitly acknowledged by calling for ‘a capacitated 
decision from Mrs A’, the first step was to restore her capacity.70  
 Relying heavily on the primary aim of the inherent jurisdiction, the Court of 
Protection’s preferred outcome was for Mrs A to fulfil the typical conditions required for 
informed consent. To the extent that the typical conditions for informed consent are also the 
conditions required for mental capacity, restoration of Mrs A’s capacity would, in principle, 
ensure that she had fulfilled those conditions standardly taken by theorists of autonomy to be 
necessary (though insufficient) conditions for the capacity for autonomy. However, as already 
acknowledged, fulfilling the typical conditions required for informed consent cannot be 
equated with the exercise of one’s autonomy.71 Consequently, at this point, Mrs A would face 
the same problems encountered by Mr Mazhar. Specifically, neither the MCA 2005 nor the 
facilitation of a capacitated decision ‘through “ability appropriate” help and discussion without 
undue contrary pressure from Mr A’ can capture or promote her autonomy because:72 (i) the 
MCA 2005 fails to distinguish between the conditions for mental capacity and the conditions 
for autonomy; and (ii) current applications of the inherent jurisdiction, to the extent that they 
are concerned with unencumbered decision making, fail to engage with the question of whether 
a capacitous vulnerable individual fulfils the conditions of rational deliberation that 
 
70 ibid., at [75] per Bodey J. 
71 Keywood (op. cit. note 37, 330) also makes this point in relation to Bodey J.’s judgment. 
72 A Local Authority v Mrs A and Mr A [2010] EWHC 1549 (Fam) (COP) at [75] per Bodey J. 
 23 
philosophers and moral psychologists take to be a necessary feature of autonomous choice and 
action. In other words, such an approach precludes engagement with the very question of 
whether Mrs A could reason soundly in accordance with her own values, desires and motives 
and come to a decision that coheres with those motivating reasons. Therefore, discounting Mrs 
A’s lack of capacity, the case reveals the problem with the first standard common law response 
to vulnerability, that is, the failure of the court to adequately acknowledge the relationship 
between the concept of autonomy and the concept of vulnerability. More worryingly, as 
Keywood observes, the judge’s concern with liberty rather than autonomy meant that even if 
Mrs A could make a capacitated decision having received third-party support, it is by no means 
clear that Mr A’s malign influence would not have provided grounds for the vitiation of that 
consent in line with preceding legal responses to the vulnerability of capacitous individuals.73  
 It was previously stated that analytic feminists take the opposition between ‘the liberal 
(autonomous) subject’ and ‘the vulnerable subject’ to be problematic for three reasons. The 
third reason is because the idealised conception of the liberal (autonomous) person fails to 
attend appropriately to the ways in which an individual’s ability to exercise their autonomy in 
decision-making situations is dependent on legal and health care recognition.74 For example, 
where liberty is concerned, the practice of informed consent does not just require a capacitous 
adult patient to communicate a decision having been sufficiently informed of the material 
treatment risks. Successful participation in an economy of consent depends on the recognition 
of the patient’s speech acts as the kinds of acts that they are, specifically, permissions and 
refusals.75 Similarly, where autonomy is concerned, succeeding in making claims to one’s 
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autonomy is impossible for one to do on one’s own (as demonstrated by the cases of Mr Mazhar 
and TZ). According to Catriona Mackenzie, ‘a self-determining life requires not just having 
the capacities and opportunities to do so but also regarding oneself, and being recognised by 
others, as having the social status of an autonomous agent’.76 The point is that although a 
patient may have the necessary cognitive capacities for reason, her attempts at exercising and 
achieving autonomy will fail if her commitments, decisions or status as an autonomous agent 
are not accorded appropriate recognition. Therefore, in medical decision-making contexts, 
succeeding in exercising one’s autonomy is dependent not only on the recognition that one has 
the status of autonomy, but also on health care staff and/or the courts meeting the prescribed 
uptake conditions associated with one’s permissions and refusals. It follows that when a 
capacitous vulnerable adult recognises herself as someone with the normative authority to 
make medical decisions on the basis of her own values, desires and motives, the denial of that 
authority not only violates her sovereignty (when medical interventions go against her 
decisions), it also violates her status of, and claims to, autonomy. Due to the fact that a 
situationally vulnerable patient’s status of and claims to autonomy, and thereby the desired 
outcomes of her decisions, are ultimately dependent on relational practices of recognition, 
some analytic feminists have argued that autonomy is ‘vulnerable’ to the denial of 
recognition.77 On that basis, they have concluded that the concepts of vulnerability and 
autonomy are necessarily entwined rather than opposed. In short, they are necessarily entwined 
because whether a person – legally vulnerable or not – has the status of someone with the 
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authority to be self-governing and self-determining, and, accordingly, whether they are able to 
make claims to, exercise and achieve their autonomy, is, in part, dependent on the actions of 
others in ways that are outside of the person’s control. 
 At this point, it should be mentioned that legal scholars have also acknowledged the 
problems that arise when ‘general protections’ for capacitous individuals are supplanted by 
‘special protections’ for legally vulnerable individuals. Indeed, in some cases, these problems 
have been identified, in part, via engagement with feminist philosophy.78 So why is this paper 
returning to analytic feminist approaches to vulnerability and autonomy rather than seeking to 
develop those responses to vulnerability that have been presented in feminist legal scholarship? 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a comprehensive analysis of the relevant 
legal literature, I suggest that the return to analytic feminism is needed because key proposals 
for legal and social policy reform have addressed current legal responses to vulnerable adults 
in general and have thereby not adequately captured or resolved the specific autonomy 
concerns of capacitous, situationally vulnerable adults.79 Ultimately, the problem with these 
proposals is that they are, in part, informed by the suggestion that for those deemed to be 
capacitous, situational sources of vulnerability will remain undisclosed, meaning that they will 
be seen as ‘invulnerable’. However, as we have seen in the cases involving Mr Mazhar and TZ, 
situational sources of vulnerability do inform common law responses in ways that undermine 
a capacitous vulnerable adult’s ability to exercise their autonomy. Therefore, one cannot 
reasonably assume that mere capacity is sufficient to protect a vulnerable individual’s 
autonomy at law. Nevertheless, as shall be shown in section 4, some aspects of these respective 
proposals regarding the common law treatment of vulnerable adults can be usefully 
appropriated to enhance a normative framework for capturing and promoting their autonomy. 
 
78 E.g., Fineman (2008) op. cit. note 2; Fineman (2010) op. cit. note 2; Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3; Lindsey op. 
cit. note 3; Clough (2017) op. cit. note 3; Wilson op. cit. note 2. 
79 E.g., Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3; Lindsey op. cit. note 3; Clough (2017) op. cit. note 3..    
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Alternatively, where other proposals for legal and social policy reform have been put forward 
with the potential to impact upon current legal responses to capacitous vulnerable adults, they 
have not adequately considered the claim that the concepts of autonomy and situational 
vulnerability are necessarily entwined.80 By not grounding proposals in this conceptual 
relationship between autonomy and situational vulnerability, the ability of these legal accounts 
to successfully capture and promote the autonomy and liberty of capacitous vulnerable adults 
is significantly limited.     
 By way of an example, Martha Fineman has focused on the concept of ontological 
vulnerability as a ‘universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition’ in order to 
address the limitations of accounts of inequality and injustice in liberal legal theory.81 Like 
analytic feminists, Fineman takes issue with the concept of the liberal ideal of a free, 
independent, autonomous, rational subject. She argues for a reorientation of legal theory 
focused on the vulnerable subject, one that ‘encompasses a wide range of differing and 
interdependent abilities over the span of a lifetime’.82 Ultimately, as Mackenzie has 
demonstrated,83 the problems with Fineman’s approach are that it does not explicitly deal with 
other forms of vulnerability, including the situational vulnerability that comes under the High 
Court’s inherent jurisdiction, and, more importantly, it sets up the vulnerable subject and the 
autonomous subject as oppositional concepts in much the same way as we find in common law 
responses to situationally vulnerable adults. As we have seen, when situational vulnerability 
and autonomy are conceived as fundamentally opposed, duties of protection can be invoked to 
justify overly paternalistic forms of intervention that violate autonomy and generate forms of 
pathogenic vulnerability. By contrast, as shall be demonstrated in the following sections, if 
 
80 E.g., Fineman (2008) op. cit. note 2; Fineman (2010) op. cit. note 2; Wilson op. cit. note 2. Section 4 shows 
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82 ibid., 12 
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situational vulnerability and autonomy are conceived as necessarily entwined, then we can 
argue for the promotion of a capacitous vulnerable adult’s autonomy where possible, thereby 
fulfilling the primary purpose of the inherent jurisdiction as it relates to vulnerable adults with 
mental capacity, that is, to facilitate ‘autonomy of decision making’. However, in arguing for 
this response to situational vulnerability, autonomy will not be conflated with an 
individualised, abstract, liberal conception of autonomy nor will it be conflated with the 
fulfilment of the typical conditions required for informed consent, which, as we have seen, is 
the stated aim of the High Court’s first standard response to situational vulnerability. In order 
to capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults, a specific conception of autonomy in 
analytic feminism will be developed, one that is relational and necessarily dependent on 
concrete, intersubjective practices of recognition.  
 Like Fineman, Kay E. Wilson has also considered the deficiencies in the concept of the 
liberal, autonomous subject.84 However, she also acknowledges the problems that can arise 
when approaches that focus solely on ontological vulnerability fail to address the situational 
vulnerability that leads to the characterisation of certain adults as ‘vulnerable’ at law. 
Responding to the feminist scholarship of Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, Wilson explores the 
ways in which three different types of vulnerability – inherent, situational and pathogenic – 
can and cannot account for the vulnerability of persons with mental impairments in the light of 
current mental health law.85 In much the same way as this paper has diagnosed the problems 
with responses to situationally vulnerable capacitous adults at common law, Wilson identifies 
‘mental health law as a cause of, rather than the solution to, vulnerability’ in the sense that it is 
both discriminatory and ‘unnecessarily restrictive of the legal capacity, liberty, and bodily 
integrity of persons with mental impairments’.86 She also identifies three main approaches to 
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legal reform or abolition: 1) the Abolition with Support; 2) Mental Capacity with Support; and 
3) Support Except Where There is Harm Models. As she acknowledges, ‘all three approaches 
to the abolition or reform of mental health law and some recent case law developments 
expanding the meaning of “best interests” [i.e., in light of s.4(4) and s.4(6) of the MCA 2005] 
are directed towards giving more empowerment and new legal recognition to the subjective 
wishes of persons with mental impairments and disabilities’.87 Of the three approaches, Wilson 
argues for the Mental Capacity with Support Model, which involves the employment of a 
protective framework if, after receiving support that allows her to consider her options, a person 
with mental impairment is deemed to lack mental capacity.88 Otherwise, persons with mental 
impairments should be accorded legal recognition with regards to their care and treatment 
decisions.  
 Although Wilson appropriates the work of analytic feminists to diagnose the issues 
surrounding typical responses to vulnerability in mental health law, the problem with her 
proposal for a Mental Capacity with Support Model is that it does not follow on from the 
argument made by those same analytic feminists that the concepts of autonomy and situational 
vulnerability are conceptually entwined. Although Wilson argues that persons with mental 
impairments should be accorded the same legal recognition as legally non-vulnerable 
individuals if they are judged to have mental capacity, the problem, as we have already 
observed, is that even though situationally vulnerable adults are judged to have capacity, one 
of the standard responses at common law involves denying them their decision-making 
authority on the basis that they are deemed unable to give genuine consent. In other words, the 
success of Wilson’s proposal is, ultimately, dependent on common law responses that either 
consider situational vulnerability and autonomy to be incompatible concepts or fail to 
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adequately acknowledge the conceptual relationship between them. Thus, as shall be explained 
further in the following section, by basing her approach solely on mental capacity, Wilson’s 
proposal is unable to capture the autonomy and liberty of capacitous vulnerable persons, let 
alone guarantee legitimate legal recognition for situationally vulnerable individuals in concrete 
decision-making contexts.    
 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE ENTWINEMENT OF AUTONOMY AND 
VULNERABILITY 
 
From an analytic feminist perspective that emphasises the ‘concrete’ and ‘relational’ 
dimensions of autonomy, the argument that the concepts ‘autonomy’ and ‘situational 
vulnerability’ are necessarily entwined cannot appeal merely to mental capacity, standards of 
informed consent or processes of ‘unencumbered decision making’.  
 The test for incapacity in section 3(1) of the MCA 2005 raises a strong, negative 
affirmation of autonomy, whereby an individual is unable to make a decision if they are unable 
to understand, retain, use or weigh information relevant to a decision or if they are unable to 
communicate a decision. Similarly, medical ethicists have appealed to the idea of autonomous 
patients as competent patients, whereby competency tends to require the capacities to 
comprehend and critically reflect on information, revise beliefs and make a decision in the light 
of information.89 Mental capacity not only grounds traditional approaches to the principle of 
respect for patient autonomy in medical ethics, but, in accordance with common law doctrine, 
it supports an individual’s legal capacity to partake in processes of informed consent and 
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Bioethics 2(2), 37–47; B Foddy & J Savulescu, ‘Addiction and autonomy: Can addicted people consent to the 
prescription of their drug of addiction?’ (2006) Bioethics 20(1), 1-15. 
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thereby – at least implicitly – provides her with the legal opportunity to make decisions on the 
basis of her own values, desires and motivations.  
 The issues here are manifold. Firstly, as already observed, a problem with the MCA 
2005 is that it fails to distinguish between the conditions for mental capacity and the conditions 
for the exercise of autonomy. As Herring and Wall observe,90 the exercise of autonomy ‘is the 
result of the combination of a cognitive process (understanding facts) and an affective process 
(attributing value to an outcome)’ whereby the affective process requires ‘that a person’s (first-
order) desires are accompanied by the (second-order) appropriation of, or identification with, 
the desires’ and that the motivating attitudes which an individual endorses or rationally 
responds to are her own (i.e., they are authentic). By contrast, under the MCA 2005, capacity 
is expressed in terms of a capacity for reason, that is, a capacity for understanding relevant 
information, using it and weighing it.91 Therefore, although the conditions for mental capacity 
are often taken to be necessary conditions for the capacity for autonomy, they do not 
sufficiently guarantee one’s ability to successfully exercise one’s autonomy. Furthermore, a 
purely capacity-based approach to autonomy cannot adequately address scenarios where the 
impaired interaction between the affective component and the cognitive component limits or 
undermines autonomous decision making. Hence, mere recourse to the MCA 2005 is especially 
problematic in cases concerning capacitous vulnerable adults, who are, by definition, already 
competent, because, given the conceptual apparatus afforded by the Act, their judged 
vulnerability at law precludes any statutory-based engagement with the question of whether 
they are able to exercise their mental capacity in light of their own values, desires and 
motivations and in accordance with the standards of rationality commonly required by theories 
of autonomy.92 Secondly, appealing to mental capacity and, by extension, the MCA 2005 as 
 
90 Herring and Wall op. cit. note 6, 699-700, 708. 
91 Keywood op. cit. note 37, 329-330; Clough (2014) op cit. note 3, 372; Herring and Wall op. cit. note 6, 699-
700, 708. 
92 Keywood op. cit. note 37, 329-330. 
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the basis for the claim that autonomy and vulnerability are necessarily entwined fails, in 
practice, to capture the autonomy of vulnerable adults with capacity.93 As we have seen, even 
when an individual is judged to have mental capacity in accordance with the standards listed 
in section 3(1) of the MCA 2005, the consideration of her capacity in the light of her 
vulnerability at law, specifically, in the light of those risks that are deemed to compromise her 
‘autonomy of decision making’, results in the denial of her decision-making authority in order 
to ensure that either the standards of informed consent are fulfilled through a facilitative 
process or decisions in her best interests are effected. Not only do these common law responses 
to situational vulnerability combined with standards set in the MCA 2005 fail to capture a 
capacitous vulnerable adult’s autonomy, analytic feminists have argued that responding to 
vulnerability through a protective framework can violate her autonomy as well as undermine 
it in other ways. It can contribute to the formation of false norms and beliefs or non-authentic 
values, desires and preferences.94 It can limit the sorts of values, desires and motives she is able 
to recognise.95 In addition, it can contribute to a lack of self-respect and self-esteem,96 mistrust 
of her own decisions,97 or an inability to recognise her decisions and commitments as 
meaningful, worthwhile and valuable.98 The point is that overly paternalistic approaches to 
 
93 For an explanation of why mental capacity cannot be merely equated with autonomy in general and the 
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historical selves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
95 P Benson, ‘Autonomy and oppressive socialization’, (1991) Social Theory and Practice 17, 385–408; C 
Mackenzie & N Stoljar, ‘Autonomy refigured’ in C Mackenzie and N Stoljar (eds), Relational autonomy: Feminist 
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moral philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 124-42; Mackenzie (2008) op. cit. note 77. 
97 T Govier, ‘Self-trust, autonomy, and self-esteem’, (1993) Hypatia 8, 99-120; C McLeod, Self-trust and 
reproductive autonomy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Mackenzie (2008) op. cit. note 77. 
98 Mackenzie (2008) op. cit. note 77. 
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situational vulnerability can causally shape a vulnerable adult’s practical identity and self-
understanding (and thereby her values, desires, motivations and reasoning processes) in a 
manner beyond her initial control and in ways that undermine her ability to flourish. In such 
circumstances, even though the situationally vulnerable adult is deemed to be competent, and 
despite appearing to demonstrate ‘effective use of reason’, it has been argued that her power 
behind whatever reasoning that gives rise to her behaviour has been compromised such that 
respecting her decisions would not be consistent with respecting her autonomy.99 
 When it comes to accounting for the conceptual entwinement of vulnerability and 
autonomy, standard approaches to informed consent in medical law and medical ethics are 
equally problematic. Due to the establishment of the conception of situational vulnerability in 
Re SA as a legal precedent for subsequent judgments involving the exercise of the inherent 
jurisdiction, the model of informed consent is incompatible with situational vulnerability.100 
Legally valid consent requires that it be given voluntarily. However, according to Munby J., 
the inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in relation to a vulnerable adult who is at risk of not 
being able to exercise a real and genuine decision to consent.101 On the basis that legal 
precedent has established situational vulnerability in terms of the risks of being constrained, 
coerced or prevented from ‘forming or expressing a real and genuine consent’, the model of 
informed consent excludes those who have been legally identified as vulnerable precisely 
because the voluntariness of their decisions is deemed to be at risk. As Michael Dunn, Isabel 
Clare and Anthony Holland observe, a judgment that a person has the capacity to consent ‘will 
be considered an inconvenient truth when that person is also judged to be at risk of being 
constrained, coerced, or unduly influenced’.102  
 
99 ibid., 518–9. 
100 Coggon and Miola op. cit. note 7, 527-28. 
101 Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage) [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 867 at [77] per 
Munby J. 
102 Dunn, Clare and Holland op. cit. note 23, 247. Also see Skowron op. cit. note 1. 
 33 
 Legal scholars, including Herring, Wall and Clough,103 have respectively endorsed the 
employment of the inherent jurisdiction as a means to overcome the problems with a purely 
capacity-based approach to the autonomy of vulnerable individuals. However, such 
endorsements are based on a largely uncritical acceptance of the High Court’s stated aim to 
facilitate autonomy of decision making via ‘unencumbered decision making’, which, as we 
have seen, is a highly problematic interpretation of the aim of the inherent jurisdiction given 
that the High Court is primarily concerned with facilitating the conditions for genuine consent. 
It should be noted that although Clough does not question the High Court’s ability to fulfil its 
stated aim based on the terms according to which unencumbered decision making has been 
defined at common law, she does recognise the lack of clarity surrounding the principles 
underpinning the inherent jurisdiction.104 Thus, she claims, ‘there is a legitimate concern that 
if principles such as a presumption of capacity, the least restrictive alternative, and the 
protection of unwise decisions, are ignored, then there is a possibility of purportedly supported 
decisions becoming coercive, rather than empowering’.105 The point is that not only is 
unencumbered decision making, as currently defined at common law, not be confused with the 
restoration of autonomy, but also, as Clough implies, the success of the employment of the 
inherent jurisdiction falls outside of the control of situationally vulnerable adults. For example, 
assuming that the goal is for capacitous vulnerable adults to fulfil the standards of informed 
consent, we have already acknowledged that successful participation in an economy of consent 
depends on the recognition of the patient’s permissions and refusals as those made by 
individuals who take themselves to have the status of autonomy. Thus, the problem with the 
model of ‘unencumbered decision making’ is that it fails to acknowledge the fact that whether 
such a process enables, promotes, or, indeed, undermines or violates a situationally vulnerable 
 
103 Herring and Wall op. cit. note 6; Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3. 
104 Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3. 
105 ibid., 394. 
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adult’s ‘autonomy of decision making’ is, in part, dependent on legal and/or health care 
recognition of her status as someone with the authority to make normatively-significant 
judgments regarding her own care and medical treatment.  
 As a challenge to the idealised conception of the liberal (autonomous) person, analytic 
feminists have developed ‘relational’ accounts, which highlight the ‘vulnerability’ of personal 
autonomy. Such accounts are premised on an understanding of interpersonal and social 
relationships as background conditions for the development, exercise and achievement of 
autonomy.106 On that basis, relational theorists have argued that some relationships are hostile 
to autonomy.107 Not only can relations of domination, oppression and exclusion undermine the 
capacities required for autonomy,108 they can constrain the sorts of values, desires and motives 
an individual is able to recognise and undermine her respect for herself and her decisions.109 
Specifically, relational theorists have tended to focus on the ways in which interpersonal and 
social relations affect the authenticity conditions for autonomy.110 This coincides with the 
broader focus on autonomy understood as self-governance – an individual’s power behind 
whatever reasoning directly gives rise to their behaviour.111 
 To the extent that relational approaches to autonomy have tended to focus on the ways 
in which interpersonal and social relationships affect the authenticity conditions for autonomy, 
they cannot function as a plausible interpretation of the necessary conceptual entwinement of 
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the concepts of situational vulnerability and autonomy. Framing this claim in relation to the 
second common law response to the situational vulnerability of capacitous adults, we have 
already noted that overly paternalistic approaches can contribute to non-authentic values, 
desires and motives, a lack of self-respect, mistrust of one’s own decisions and an inability to 
recognise one’s decisions and commitments as meaningful, worthwhile and valuable. The point 
is that these ‘harms’ to the autonomy of situationally vulnerable adults with capacity are 
contingent rather than necessary. What this means is that whether a specific capacitous 
vulnerable adult experiences these effects to her autonomy will, ultimately, depend on her 
psychological states and dispositions, which, in part, constitute her practical identity and self-
understanding (and thereby determine her values, desires, motivations and reasoning 
processes). Thus, to the extent that certain analytic feminists have focused on the relational 
dimensions of self-governance, their approaches are only able to explain the ways in which 
autonomy and situational vulnerability are contingently entwined. In order to account for 
necessary conceptual entwinement of autonomy and situational vulnerability, what needs to be 
explained is how denials of a capacitous vulnerable adult’s decision-making authority generate 
harms to her autonomy regardless of her individual characteristics and resiliency to the effects 
of paternalistic intervention. 
 Returning to the case of Mr Mazhar, the NHS Trust and the High Court were not 
interfering with his internal cognitive processes that, in part, determined his ability to self-
govern. In other words, the paternalistic response to Mr Mazhar’s refusal of treatment in 
hospital did not seem to directly affect the power behind whatever reasoning directly gave rise 
to his behaviour. The fact that Mr Mazhar remained committed to his refusal throughout the 
appeal process demonstrates that he continued to hold power over his reasoning. Instead, as we 
have seen, what had been ignored by the health care staff and the High Court was his status as 
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someone with the authority to be self-governing, an act that led to the violation of his 
autonomy.  
 As we have already observed, some analytic feminists have been able to explain the 
harms to autonomy that Mr Mazhar experienced. This has involved the exploration of the 
relational dimensions of autonomy beyond the effects of interpersonal and social relationships 
on one’s reasoning processes and the values on which they are based. For these theorists, what 
accounts for the necessary conceptual entwinement of autonomy and situational vulnerability 
is the fact that autonomy is necessarily dependent on relational practices of recognition.112 
 
IV. PROMOTING THE AUTONOMY OF CAPACITOUS VULNERABLE ADULTS 
AND THE DUTY OF PROTECTION 
 
A capacitous vulnerable patient cannot determine whether the decisions she makes regarding 
her care and treatment will be respected. To succeed, she must, ultimately, be recognised as an 
individual with the status of someone who has the authority to make normatively-significant 
judgments about matters that concern her. This is what Mackenzie has referred to as the ‘self-
authorisation’ dimension of autonomy, which ‘involves regarding oneself [and being 
recognised by others] as having the normative authority to be self-determining and self-
governing’.113 Accordingly, to regard oneself as having the authority to raise and defend claims 
to one’s autonomy as a person with equal standing, one must view oneself as a ‘legitimate 
source of reasons for acting’.114 As Axel Honneth and Joel Anderson observe, ‘if one cannot 
think of oneself as a competent deliberator and legitimate co-author of decisions, it is hard to 
 
112 E.g., Anderson (2003) op. cit. note 77; Anderson and Honneth op. cit. note 77; Mackenzie (2008) op. cit. note 
77; Westlund (2009) op. cit. note 77; Anderson (2014) op. cit. note 63; Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds op. cit. 
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see how one can take oneself seriously in one’s own practical reasoning about what to do’.115 
However, such ‘self-respect’ must be genuine in the sense that one must be disposed to vouch 
for the self-recognition of one’s normative authority as warranted or deserved.116 According 
to analytic feminists who have explored this account of self-authorisation, one’s normative 
authority should be recognised as warranted or deserved if one is in control of one’s values, 
desires and motivations. In short, I must recognise that the values on which I deliberate are my 
own rather than the products of malign external influences.117 In turn, analytic feminists have 
argued that once one takes one’s authority to be legitimate, then one accepts that one is able to 
speak for oneself and thereby answer to others.118 
 In order to account for the necessary relationship between vulnerability and autonomy, 
analytic feminists who have adopted the self-authorisation approach to autonomy seemingly 
invoke what Coggon refers to as ‘best desire autonomy’ whereby a decided upon action 
‘reflects a person’s overall desire given his own values, even if this runs contrary to his 
immediate desire’.119 Coggon considers this to be the best approach to autonomy when serious 
decisions are at stake. This raises an important question about how an individual can discern 
her own motivating attitudes from those that have been formed by malign external influences. 
The self-authorisation approach to relational autonomy is predicated on an affective attitude of 
genuine self-respect, which necessarily includes a disposition to answer for the soundness of 
one’s decisions. However, even when someone views themselves with respect, they may 
nonetheless adapt their preferences and desires because of the social conditions in which they 
live. Nevertheless, the adaption of (first-order) preferences and desires is not problematic 
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provided that it is accompanied by the (second-order) critical reflection about one’s own 
preferences, desires, goals, values and so on.  Such an approach also explains why this account 
does not follow calls by Lindsey for the courts to analyse vulnerability from an embodied 
perspective.120 The embodied dimension of autonomy is highly contested by theorists of 
autonomy.121 On that basis, this account is based on the straightforwardly cognitive and rational 
dimensions of autonomy that most theorists, medical ethicists and, indeed, legal scholars like 
Coggon, Miola, Herring, Wall and Keywood take to be the central feature of autonomous 
choice and action. 
 On the basis that viewing oneself as having legitimate authority to make decisions is a 
necessary condition of autonomy, this account can be employed to bridge the gap between 
autonomy and liberty in medical law. Specifically, self-authorisation includes the idea that 
patients have the right to protect their domain of sovereignty by expressing their permissions 
and refusals.122 Consequently, from a normative standpoint, self-authorisation grounds the 
extension of liberty at law to situationally vulnerable adults with capacity. The point is that 
even though an individual is situationally vulnerable and, therefore, on the basis of legal 
definition, deemed unable to give genuine consent according to standards of voluntariness, she 
regards as herself as someone who has the status of being an autonomous individual. She 
recognises that she is competent enough and in control of her values, desires and motivations. 
As a result, she recognises that she fulfils the conditions necessary to make legitimate decisions 
regarding her care and treatment. Ultimately, from an autonomy and a liberty perspective, she 
takes herself to be of equal standing with capacitous patients who the law deems to be non-
vulnerable.  
 
120 Lindsey op. cit. note 3. 
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 Recall that self-authorisation, as well as requiring that one regard oneself as having the 
authority to be self-determining and self-governing, demands that one be recognised by those 
to whom claims to autonomy are addressed. After all, as analytic feminists have demonstrated, 
self-authorisation implies that autonomy is anathema to insulating oneself from critique.123 It 
follows that ‘vouching for oneself puts one’s claim to respect and esteem into the public domain 
as open to dispute’.124 Accordingly, autonomy is also intersubjective. When a capacitous 
vulnerable patient expresses her permissions and refusals in relation to specific health care 
interventions, she is appealing to clinical practitioners and the courts for recognition of her 
legitimate authority to make her own decisions regarding her care and treatment in line with 
her own values, motives and desires. As Anderson observes, ‘without intersubjective 
recognition, the “actuality” of what one is vouching for is left in suspension’.125 
 Having outlined a conception of legitimate, self-authorised autonomy that is 
necessarily dependent on interpersonal recognition, the question remains as to how this 
approach to autonomy could be applied by health care staff and the courts not only to overcome 
the problems with standard common law responses to the situational vulnerability of capacitous 
adults, but also to deal with the tension between two incompatible obligations: (i) the self-
prescribed duty of the courts to promote the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults; and (ii) 
the duty to protect them from harms to their health, well-being and other interests. Unlike 
standard common law responses to situational vulnerability, an approach to autonomy that is 
based on self-authorisation does not treat the concepts of situational vulnerability and 
autonomy as conceptually incompatible. Quite the opposite; it is predicated on the necessary 
entwinement of situational vulnerability and autonomy in the sense that an individual’s 
autonomy is, in part, necessarily ‘vulnerable’ to the denial of legitimate recognition. As a result, 
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so long as a situationally vulnerable individual with capacity satisfies the conditions of 
legitimacy that have already been detailed and thereby recognises that she is of equal standing 
with all other (legally non-vulnerable) capacitous patients, there should be no autonomy-based 
reasons for treating her any differently to a legally non-vulnerable patient. It follows that the 
guiding principle for health care staff and the courts is to promote the autonomy of capacitous 
vulnerable patients where possible. Due to the fact that this principle should guide health care 
staff in their responses to vulnerable adults in clinical or care-based decision-making contexts, 
it is worth noting that if this approach to self-authorised autonomy is successfully employed, 
then, in principle, it should reduce the number of applications for pre-emptive, protective 
intervention made by health care providers to the courts. 
 If the guiding principle for health care staff and the courts is to promote the autonomy 
of capacitous vulnerable patients where possible, then there are three main normative 
considerations for navigating the tension between the duty to promote their autonomy and the 
duty to protect them from other harms.  
 First, if the situationally vulnerable individual chooses not to defer the care or treatment 
decision to health care practitioners or the courts, then, as we have seen, she will need to 
determine whether she has legitimate normative authority to be self-determining and self-
governing and thereby to make specific care or treatment decisions on the basis of her own 
values, desires and motivations. Thus, she will need to determine that the reasons on which her 
decision is based are not the results of constraint, coercion, undue influence, and so on. If, 
however, she is unable to effect an attitude of self-respect necessary to take herself to be a 
legitimate source of reasons for acting and if she is unable to critically distance herself from 
any adaptive values and desires, then this is a reasonable basis for overriding the duty to 
promote her autonomy. In short, it is a reason that counts in favour of the duty to protect her 
from harms to her health, well-being and other interests through, for example, an application 
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under, or the exercise of, the inherent jurisdiction. However, even though a protective response 
may be justified in such instances, at least that response will be derived from considerations of 
autonomy rather than from considerations of the effects of malign external influences on an 
individual’s ability to fulfil the typical conditions required for giving genuine consent, the focus 
on which precludes adequate engagement with the very question of that individual’s autonomy. 
 This first normative consideration is primarily concerned with whether a capacitous 
vulnerable patient fulfils the ‘first-person’ conditions required for the exercise of autonomy. 
This involves recognising that the reasons on which her decision is based are not the results of 
malign external influences. As already observed, self-authorisation need not be problematic so 
long as any adaptive values, desires or motivations are accompanied by critical reflection on 
those attitudes to the degree that the reflection, ultimately, motivates the decision. However, 
given that capacitous vulnerable individuals are, on the basis of legal definition, deemed to be 
at risk of malign external influence, health care practitioners and the courts may be concerned 
that the process of self-authorisation is still being influenced by the sources of an individual’s 
vulnerability such that the authenticity of the motivating attitudes is called into question. This 
leads to an important epistemic consideration, one recognised by advocates of Shared Decision 
Making in clinical practice.126 In terms of who judges whether an individual is able to exercise 
their autonomy by effectively employing their capacity for reason, it is the patient who is 
epistemically best placed to identify, endorse and rationally respond to her values. In spite of 
any lingering reservations that health care practitioners and the courts may have concerning 
the potential effects of coercion, oppression and manipulation on the exercise of autonomy, a 
capacitous vulnerable adult is still in the most authoritative position when it comes to her 
beliefs regarding her reasons for action. Therefore, in accordance with section 1(4) of the MCA 
2005, it is not for the health practitioner or the courts to determine or question the values 
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underpinning a capacitous vulnerable patient’s decision. Nevertheless. this does not preclude 
the possibility of responding to an individual’s situational vulnerability in ways that might 
usefully facilitate and promote her autonomy. 
 Firstly, the process of taking oneself to be a legitimate source of reasons for acting is 
fully compatible with supported decision making, particularly when health care staff, social 
care staff, family members or, indeed, the courts assist a situationally vulnerable adult with 
overcoming any barriers stopping her from successfully authorising her own values, desires 
and motives. Referring to Article 12 of the UN’s Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (‘UNCRPD’), Clough also argues that supported decision making should play a 
vital role in promoting the autonomy of vulnerable individuals.127 If a vulnerable capacitous 
patient requires support to identify, endorse or rationally respond to her values, desires and 
motivations, then this process is akin to – what Wilson refers to as – the ‘Abolition with Support 
Model’ for responding to vulnerability.128 However, whereas Wilson addresses this model as a 
sufficient means for involving vulnerable adults in decision-making processes that concern 
them, the approach detailed here treats supported decision making as a single, contingent step 
in a multi-step process of capturing and promoting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable 
adults. The main benefit of a response to situational vulnerability based on self-authorisation 
and intersubjective recognition is that, like the ‘Abolition with Support Model’, it can alleviate 
situational and pathogenic forms of vulnerability, but it is not anywhere near as radical. Rather 
than abolishing mental health law altogether, the approach outlined here suggests that legal 
reform is required. In particular, allowing vulnerable patients to make decisions regarding their 
care and treatment should be a legal obligation grounded in autonomy rather than in (shifting) 
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interpretations of the UNCRPD. In addition, the basis on which the inherent jurisdiction is 
employed should be reformed along autonomy (as opposed to capacity or consent) lines.  
 Secondly, whereas the courts have tended to focus ‘on labelling and monitoring the 
vulnerable adult’, an alternative approach could involve the employment of targeted civil law 
interventions to only restrict the situational cause of an individual’s vulnerability (i.e., the 
source of coercion, oppression, manipulation, and so on).129 As Lindsey observes, the form that 
such interventions take will ultimately depend on the specific features of the situation and the 
individual characteristics of the situationally vulnerable individual such that they ‘allow the 
autonomy of the adult to develop free from oppressive influences…in a way which involves 
the least risk of creating vulnerability through the intervention’.130 By way of an example, 
Lindsey suggests that the intervention in A Local Authority v Mrs A and Mr A [2010] should 
have taken the form of a court injunction to prevent Mr A from interfering with Mrs A.131 
However, she also recognises that, in other cases, an intervention that bans coercive, 
oppressive, manipulative or abusive individuals from contacting their situationally vulnerable 
partners may risk generating more vulnerability on the part of the situationally vulnerable adult. 
In such instances, more reasonable sets of restrictions may be called for, including, for 
example, restricting partners of situationally vulnerable adults from being under the influence 
of alcohol or from being verbally or physically threatening towards their partners and decision-
making support staff.  
 The common theme is that such interventions should only be directed against the 
external cause of an individual’s situational vulnerability and not against the vulnerable 
individual herself. As a result, these kinds of intervention differ from the current employment 
of the inherent jurisdiction, which, as we have seen, either denies situationally vulnerable adults 
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their decision-making authority in favour of best-interest decisions or directs interventions 
specifically at the vulnerable adult in order to enable her to fulfil the conditions for genuine 
consent at the expense of targeting the source of any impairment. By contrast, targeting the 
cause of an individual’s situational vulnerability would, as Lindsey observes, involve the least 
risk of generating pathogenic forms of vulnerability that, as we have seen, can render a 
situationally vulnerable individual even more powerless to make claims to, and exercise, her 
autonomy.132 In addition, although such an intervention may generate the same result as current 
employments of the inherent jurisdiction (i.e., a space for unencumbered decision making), the 
purpose of the intervention is not to facilitate the typical conditions required for informed 
consent, but to support the individual’s ability to exercise her autonomy, which is both 
conceptually and pragmatically different from informed consent.133 Targeting the situational 
source of vulnerability might also be supported by a capacitous vulnerable adult’s network of 
family, friends and social care support.134  
 In terms of a third possible approach to facilitating autonomy, Lindsey observes that it 
would wrong to argue that the law can provide a complete solution to what is a significant 
social problem.135 Clough, for example, has explored the implications of a ‘responsive state’ 
for the provision of supportive background conditions for autonomy. On the basis that ‘the 
development and sustained exercise of the capacity for self-determination requires ongoing 
interpersonal, social and institutional scaffolding which can be thwarted by social domination, 
oppression and disadvantage’, she argues that ‘the state has obligations to develop social, 
political and legal institutions that foster the autonomy of citizens’.136  
 
132 ibid., 309-311. 
133 Keywood op. cit. note 37, 329-330; Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3, 372; Herring and Wall op. cit. note 6, 699. 
134 Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3, 391. 
135 Lindsey op. cit. note 3, 312. 
136 Clough (2014) op. cit. note 3, 382-3. 
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 In terms of the second normative consideration, if the situationally vulnerable 
individual is able to recognise herself as having legitimate authority to make her own decisions 
regarding her care and treatment, then, bearing in mind that self-authorisation implies that 
autonomy is anathema to insulating oneself from critique, she should be disposed to answer for 
that decision.137 In other words, she should be disposed to demonstrate that her treatment 
decision coheres with her own values, motives or values. Although being disposed to vouch 
for her legitimate normative authority does not morally require a capacitous vulnerable 
individual to answer for her decisions, health care staff may reasonably request her to do so in 
a particular decision-making instance in order to ensure – what Coggon and Miola refer to as 
– the effective use of her reasoning and thereby to avoid seeking declarations from the courts. 
Again, if, in such a situation, a capacitous vulnerable adult is unable or unwilling to 
demonstrate that her permission or refusal coheres with her motivating attitudes, then there is 
a reasonable basis for the health care staff and/or the courts to focus on their duties of 
protection.  
 At this point, one might question why capacitous vulnerable adults in particular are 
required to be disposed to answer for their decisions. From a pragmatic perspective, unlike for 
other capacitous patients (i.e., those that are legally non-vulnerable), mere capacity is not 
sufficient to guarantee a vulnerable adult’s autonomy of decision making at law. Developing a 
normative framework to capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults involves moving 
beyond capacity and considering whether an individual is able to exercise their autonomy by 
effectively employing their capacity for reason to identify with, endorse or rationally respond 
to their motivating attitudes. Relatedly, and from a theoretical perspective, commitment to the 
proposed relational conception of autonomy demands that if a patient sees herself as the 
legitimate source of reasons for action, then it is necessarily the case that she is disposed to 
 
137 Westlund (2009) op. cit. note 77. 
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answer for those decisions. One’s fulfilment of the conditions for the effective use of reason 
cannot be separated from one’s recognition that one is able to speak for oneself and thereby 
answer to others. Even though a capacitous vulnerable patient is epistemically best placed to 
identify, endorse and rationally respond to her values, judgments of coherence, as a standard 
of moral justification, are judgments that any third party, including practitioners and the courts, 
can arrive at once the patient provides them with her decision and values. Ideally, if we could 
reform the MCA 2005 along autonomy (rather than capacity or consent) lines, then all 
capacitous individuals (i.e., whether legally vulnerable or non-vulnerable) would be required 
to be disposed to demonstrate the soundness of their reasoning. However, given that there is a 
gap in the Act through which capacitous vulnerable individuals have fallen, and given that 
consideration of their autonomy is something that is thereby contingent on responses at 
common law, the normative framework presented here is primarily concerned with offering 
health care practitioners and the courts a way to consider the autonomy of these individuals in 
order to better support the primary aim of the inherent jurisdiction – to facilitate autonomy of 
decision making. 
 The third consideration relates to the necessary dependence of a vulnerable patient’s 
autonomy on the recognition of those to whom her claims to autonomy are addressed. The 
point is that if she satisfies the criteria associated with the preceding two normative 
considerations, then her legitimate authority to make her own decisions regarding her care and 
treatment should be recognised by health care practitioners and/or the courts thereby securing 
her status as an autonomous individual. Furthermore, if health care staff and/or the courts 
recognise that a situationally vulnerable adult has the status of autonomy like any other 
capacitous patient, then, in keeping with section 1(4) of the MCA 2005, she should be allowed 
to make her decisions no matter how ‘unwise’ they may seem and ‘no matter how unpalatable 
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they may appear to the public’.138 Ultimately, if such recognition is granted, then there is no 
autonomy-based reason not to respect her decision, including her permissions and refusals 
regarding specific care or therapeutic interventions.  
 What we can extrapolate from these three normative considerations is a specified 
version of the claim that health care staff and the courts should promote the autonomy of 
capacitous vulnerable patients where possible. Specifically, as these three considerations show, 
for any normative framework based on the concept of self-authorised autonomy, there is the 
requirement for health care providers and the courts to provide the opportunity for situationally 
vulnerable patients (and those performing a supportive role in the decision-making process) to 
fulfil the aforementioned conditions before any pre-emptive duties of protection are effected. 
As already implied, some health care practitioners may be satisfied to recognise a situationally 
vulnerable patient as someone with the status of autonomy without requiring her to explicitly 
vouch for the coherence of her decisions. However, if one of the aims of promoting the 
autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults is to avoid legal interventions that currently lead to 
the denial of decision-making authority and the violation of autonomy, then the attending 
clinical practitioner may reasonably request a situationally vulnerable patient to provide details 
of her reasons for her permission or refusal in order to determine that her treatment decision 
does, in fact, cohere with those values, desires and motives. Of course, the process of having a 
situationally vulnerable, yet capacitous, patient answer for the legitimacy of her normative 
authority and thereby the legitimacy of her resulting decisions may require greater levels of 
health care practitioner and/or court support than would usually be accorded a legally non-
vulnerable patient. But just because such a process may require more health care/court 
resources, more time and, potentially, more detailed exploration of a patient’s motivating 
attitudes, this is not a good reason for either health care staff or the courts to avoid prioritising 
 
138 Pugh op. cit. note 53, 686.   
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the promotion of a situationally vulnerable adult’s autonomy. Indeed, this does nothing to 
undermine the guiding principle implied by the self-authorisation approach to autonomy; 
specifically, that, where possible, a situationally vulnerable patient, who legitimately 
recognises herself as someone with the status of autonomy, should be given the opportunity to 





Standard common law responses to situational vulnerability have failed to grant those the law 
deems to be vulnerable the same opportunities as legally non-vulnerable individuals to make 
claims to autonomy. Although such approaches have been defended on the grounds that they 
protect capacitous vulnerable individuals from envisaged harms and exploitation, such 
protection comes at the ethical expense of either precluding engagement with the very question 
of their autonomy or violating their autonomy and their liberty at law. An approach that calls 
for the promotion of autonomy wherever possible does not demand that capacitous vulnerable 
patients should always be granted authority to make medical decisions where they concern 
them. Rather, in the sense that a capacitous vulnerable patient’s recognition of herself as having 
the status to make medical decisions is both normatively significant and intersubjectively 
dependent, then a patient who recognises herself in such way should, where possible, be given 
the opportunity to perform those speech acts that express her choice in line with her own 
motivating attitudes before health care staff and the courts decide to focus their response on 
more established duties of protection.  
 
